Intentions and the
Logic of Interpretation
WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM
What exactly are we doing when we say that an author's intentions should or should not have a role in the interpretation of a
text? Are we making a claim about a crucial piece of evidence
which should be taken into account, if at all poss ible? Or are we
making a claim about grammar or logical character of the whole
enterprise of interpretation? In this paper I shall mount a modest
case for the latter way of construing this issue . I shall argue, that
is, that the debate about intentions has been misplaced.I It has
less to do with external avowals which an author may or may not
make about the meaning of his work and much more to do with
the fundamental goal of the interpretative process as a whole. We
will begin by sketching more fully the first option and examining
the case against appeal to intentions on that level.
When an author's intentions in writing a particular text operate
as a piece of external evidence, the logic of the situation is
relatively straightforward. In puzzling over the meaning of a text,
we normally assemble all sorts of evidence. We take into acco unt
the genre, the grammar, the style, the literary context, the usus
loquendi of the words used, the circumstances in which the text
was written, how it may have bee n or was received in its day,
how it may have been composed and put together over time , and
the like. Alongside these we now place the author's own account
of what he was doing in writing the text under review. According
to our hypothetical theory, the author's avowals will be treated as
decisive in the construal of the text. These avowals ma y themselves be expressed in a variety of ways. They may be written in
diaries or workbooks; or they may have been enshrined in a
commentary on the relevant work; or they may have been made in
some kind of public or private utterance which has been written

William J. Abmham earned his M.Div. degree at Asbury Theological Seminary
and his Ph.D. at Oxford University. He is McCrefess Associate Professor of
Evangelism at Perkins Schoof of Theology, South em Methodist University.

VOL 43 No. 1

THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

!

11

1988

12

Abraham

down and has
Of course, the author's intentions ma y
have been enshrined in the text itself. One thinks immediatel y of
what Luke has to say in his famous prologue or what John says in
his tantalizing comments towards the end of his gospel. But this is
so rarely true that we can overlook it for the moment. In an y
case, the appeal would be much the same: the author's avowals
about his intentions would be treated as having a privileged
position in the debate about the most appropriate rendering of the
text. At the very least it would require very strong evidence to
overturn what the author said he meant on any particular occasion.
The appeal to intentions as evidence for a partic ular
interpretation of a text has not, to my knowledge, been used to
displace the appeal to other kinds of evidence.
Othe r
considerations are to be included in the process of interpretation;
the issue is one of status, not exclusivism. Indeed, as applied to
Holy Scripture the appeal to the intentions of the original author
was embedded in a profound and hard-won attempt to tac kle
questions about the meaning of a text in a rigo rous and
intellectually persuasive manner. On the one hand, it was part of
a move to cut texts loose from dogmatic, theological traditions
which refused to let them speak for themselves. In earlier times
the enemy tended to be the classical creeds of the Church , while
in more recent times the great enemy has been real and imagined
forms of Fundamentalism. On the other hand, it was an attempt
to rid scholarship of faulty methods of interpretation--like
allegory, or hasty, pietistic application--which imposed meanings
on the text which were clearly not there in the first place.
Several interesting assumptions about texts and about human
action are built into this deliberately sketchy account of
interpretation. It is assumed, for example, that texts and autho rs
are not just contingently, but logically, connected . A text is
demarcated from mere markings on paper by its conceptual
relation to human action. Texts are in fact human , inte ntional
actions.
They are the expression of human purposes and
intentions; they are not mere events which occur as the result of
natural, Jaw - like happenings in the world; they embody and ma ke
manifest human consciousness. It is also assumed that, although
texts are actions of human subjects acting to express certa in
intentions and purposes, they are also objects in the world and as
such they possess an independence which stands over against the
would-be interpreter. However difficult it may be to decipher or
read them, texts must be approached with great patience and skill
so that their authors may be heard and understood. They should
not be railroaded into saying something which their authors did
not intend them to say. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
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author's intentions have a privileged position in the process of
interpretation because the author has privileged access to his or
her intentions. Generally speaking, the human subject knows his
or her intentions better than an external observer does, or so it is
widely held. It is this principle which surely operates as the
warrant for the special place of authorial intention in the debate
about interpretation. Finally, it is assumed in this account that we
can draw a distinction between the meaning of a text and the
significance of a text. The former remains stable; it is that which
the author intended to convey in the text. To be sure, our
account of what the author meant may have to change, for new
evidence about authorial intention may come to light and hence
lead to revisions in our interpretation. But that is one thing. It is
another thing entirely to identify the significance of what a text
says. Here we may speak of its truth or falsity, its depth or
shallowness, its relevance or irrelevance, its beauty or plainness,
and so on.
These may change drastically, depending on the
criteria of evaluation we deploy, on the circumstances in which
we find ourselves and on the personal commitments of those
making the evaluation. However we plot the distinction in detail,
some distinction between meaning and significance will be pressed
upon us by those who want to stress the crucial role of intentions
in the act of interpretation.
It is not entirely clear whether the attack on the role of
intentions is meant to cut into all of the aforementioned
assumptions. It may be simply an attack on the status of appeal to
intentions when they are seen as part of wider battery of evidence
which might be mustered by an interpreter.
Or it may be
something much more ontological and philosophical.
It is
absolutely crucial that we be clear about this, for there is far more
to intentions than meets the eye initially.2 This is one of the
enduring merits of attending to the claims of Derrida among the
deconstructionists and Rorty among the new pragmatists.3 The
latter are seeking to undermine in a very profound way the
epistemological foundationalism which has been central to Western
philosophy since Descartes.
Their work in literary criticism
generally, and their attack on intentionalism in particular, are part
and parcel of a wider vision that covers issues which go far
beyond those encompassed in traditional hermeneutics.
An
innovation of the magnitude they are seeking cannot hang on some
kind of intentional fallacy, however generously construed; nor for
that matter can it hinge on appeal to some expert in the field of
literary criticism.
Such an attack will depend on substantive
philosophical moves in epistemology, and Rorty at least is only too
aware of the demands that this lays upon both him and Derrida.
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Indeed, what both Rorty and Derrida want to do is to overturn
philosophy and epistemology, yet to do so they must deploy
recognizably philosophical arguments, a feat which no one has as
yet successfully performed . So we do well to isolate the debate
about intentions initially as a debate about the status of certain
kinds of evidence in the interpretation of a text.
It is not difficult to find fault with the appeal to intentions in
the interpretation of a text, and ever since Wimsatt and Beardsley
published their famous article on the "intentional fallacy," many
have followed their lead in banishing intentions from the process
of interpretation proper. 4 Their strictures about intention were
initially limited to the interpretation of poetry, but as the debate
proceeded they were extended to literature generally.s Of late,
opposition to intentions has been spreading to biblical studies,
most especially among those who are interested in the literary
study of the Bible. It is surely not an exaggeration to say that a
deep division has developed between those who operate
fundamentally as historians and those who operate fundamentally
as literary critics. Up ahead it is likely that the division will
become sharper and deeper.
The attack on intentions is mounted from a variety of angles.
The most popular move at first is to point to the simple fact that
in most cases, say, of the biblical literature, the author's intentions
are not accessible. Like most simple points, this is expected to
settle the issue immediately and its proponents hope to return in
triumph to a closer reading of the text, trusting that they will be
left alone to get on with their work. If this is all there is to the
debate about intentions, then indeed the debate is over and we
had best bury it for good. One could, of course, take the simple
logical expedient of accepting the consequences of this state of
affairs and arguing that this does not overthrow the place of
intentions; it just shows that we are not in a position to interpret
the relevant biblical material. Biblical scholars need not quit their
jobs, but they must now earn a living performing other functions
in the commonwealth of learning. That no one has seriously
suggested this option should make us pause and ponder what is
really at stake in the debate as a whole. Those opposed to
intentions, however, are not going to be satisfied with this abrupt
attempt to keep the commitment to intentions unharmed and
intact. So the attack proceeds apace.
Suppose we have access to the intentions of the author. For
one thing, our author may have failed to execute her intentions in
the work in question.
Yet this does not render her text
meaningless or necessarily obscure. Meaning therefore must be
logically distinct form intentions. For another, the author may
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have abandoned her original intentions in the course of her work
or she may have included material which was not at all central in
her deliberations. If the intentions have in any way changed, they
can be of no help in determining the meaning of the work in
hand. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the author best knows
her intentions. We can all be deceived or ill-informed about our
intentions. In some cases it even appears that the author had no
idea what she was up to until the work was finished and she
turned and read the work for herself, just like any other
intelligent reader. Privileged access, even if it does exist, does not
in the least guarantee infallibility; yet only infallibility could
underwrite the claim that avowals about intentions have a special
status. Add to this the fact that a text often has a surplus of
meaning over and above what the author intended . Our author
may not know the full meaning of what she is saying , or she may
be incompetent or not inclined to declare what she meant. Surely
something along these lines lies behind the commonplace among
Protestants that God has still more light to break from His Word.
The original author may have only been incipiently aware of what
she was saying; to limit oneself to intentional meaning is therefore
restrictive and spiritually debilitating. Texts are far richer than
the standard intentionalist can allow.
Furthermore, persons who talk about the intentions of an
author tend to be general and schematic, so it is not clear how
precisely they will illuminate this or that part of the text. An
author's intention to write a satire or a tragedy does not tell the
reader how to handle the details of the script. Indeed there are
cases where knowledge of the author's intentions tells us next to
nothing about the text. Thus, to know that someone wrote a play
to make a lot of money or to placate an enemy will not get us
very far in the process of interpretation. Nor can the appeal to
intentions set any ultimate guard against subjectivity, as Hirsch
and his admirers so fondly hope, for intentions are by definition
inward mental acts which are not available for inspection by the
general public. It is surely better by far to work with the text in
hand and let its precise and particular features settle whatever
disputes arise. Textual certainties may not amount to much when
weighed in the scales of knowledge, but they are all we have and
they are always to be preferred to biographical speculations which
take us away from the text and into the swamps of endless
background studies and genetic guesswork.
Finally, there are extra considerations which come into play
when we deal with a canonical text of Scripture. Text embodied
in a sacred canon takes on new meaning when read as part of the
canonical whole. As the biblical writers had no idea that their
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work would have canonical status, there is no way in which they
could have intended the meaning that their work now has, given
its place in Holy Scripture.
Attempts to get around this by
claiming that the intentions of the final editors or canonizers , or
even God, are to be the bearers of the relevant intentions is just
one last-ditch effort to save the appeal to intentions. There is
absolutely no warrant in the texts themselves for such a move;
only a dogged commitment to theory precipitates such desperate
expedients.
The consequences of this attack on intentions are extremely
significant for hermeneutics. By far the most interesting for our
purposes is that it calls into question the whole quest to ferret out
the inner life behind the outer text associated with
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Collingwood. Thus, if this attempt to
reject intentions succeeds, it will make no sense to speak of the
interpreter reversing the causal process which brought the text
into existence or of seeking to relive the thoughts which lie
behind the text. Exercises of this character will be seen as adding
nothing to the task of interpretation properly conceived; on the
contrary, they may well be construed as a devious distraction. To
be sure, such operations may be of some psychological value in
drawing attention to evidence within the text which might
otherwise go unnoticed, but they are of no deep epistemic value
and they are assuredly not the heart of the interpretive enterprise .
Those opposed to intentionalism of one sort or another are not
agreed on exactly what the heart of the enterprise should be .
Some, especially those impressed by Marx, have turned to the
social context of a text, as the key to interpretation. How far this
alternative can avoid an unacceptable form of determinism and
reductionism cannot be pursued here, but there is no denying that
placing texts in their wider social setting can be exceptionally
illuminating and the wise interpreter will develop a keen eye for
the possibilities which this option may make available. Others,
especially those interested in the formal f ea tu res and structures of
language, have turned to a close reading of the text as an
autonomous object as the hope for the future. The text itself is
read and reread until it yields up its riches. Again, there is no
denying the fascinating and penetrating observations which have
emerged from such endeavour.
Others have sought for their
literary salvation in the mining of continental, hermeneutical
philosophy and the theories of meaning developed in this fertile
domain. As some ponder the options, they sometimes gain the
impression that the task of interpretation has become a thoroughly
relativistic operation where subjectivism reigns and where there
are no controls to adjudicate between one interpretation and
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another. 1 suspect that this reaction reflects panic rather than
good judgment, but, where sentiments like this prevail, it is small
wonder that the commitment to intentions as a crucial issue in
hermeneutics dies very hard indeed .
If intentions are to be seen as crucial, however, it should not
be because appeal to intentions is the only way to head off
relativism or subjectivism. Taking this line, aside from tending to
beg vital questions against rival visions of interpretation , is likely
to breed fantasy and confusion in our hermeneutics . If intentions
are important, it is not just because we want them to be important
or because we fail to be attracted by anti-intentionalist or nonintentionalist accounts of interpretation. They should be taken
seriously because reference to them is logically indispensable in
any plausible account of interpretation.
In recent analytical
philosophy precisely such an account has emerged over the last
generation. The account in question began !ife as an attempt to
solve certain problems in the philosophy of language and was then
applied to the debate about interpretation.
Even though the primary work on this issue is highly
technical, the relevant data for the task of interpretation can be
stated quite succinctly. The key point to grasp is that the meaning
of an utterance is not just a matter of the discourse deployed or
the sentences uttered; it is fundamentally a matter of the speech
act performed by the speaker on specific occasions in particular
contexts.
Moreover, the speech act performed is in turn
determined by the intentions of the relevant speaker. Hence the
interpretation of an utterance, and by extension the interpretation
of a text, is logically related to the action performed by the person
or persons who made the utterance or produced the text, and the
action can only be identified by referring to the intention which
governs it.
The standard way to deal with the issue at stake here is to
attend to what J. L. Austin referred to as the illocutionary force
of an utterance. 6 Thus when someone in normal circumstances
seriously utters the sentence, "Shut the door," there are three
distinct elements to be noted. There is the locution itself or the
locutionary act; the speaker has said this particular sentence.
There is, secondly, the act performed in what has been said; in
this case an order has been given.
Finally, there is a
perlocutionary element in that this particular act may have had
certain effects on its hearer; say, it may have made the hearer feel
sad. According to Austin and those who have borrowed or built
on his work, understanding the illocutionary force of an utterance
is essential to understanding the meaning of an utterance, hence it
is quite inadequate simply to attend to the public meaning of the
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sentence uttered . Thus, to take a hackneyed example, if someone
were to say, "There is thin ice over there," it is essential not only
to know what the various parts of this sentence mean in English
but also to know how the speaker is using the sentence. Normally
we ta ke it as an affirmation, but in various circumstances this
sentence could be an order, a warning, an insult or a request. To
know this we need to know the intentions of the speaker in using
this particular utterance. Discarding any reference to intentions
and attending closely merely to the locutionary act in question will
e liminate , therefore, an essential ingred ient in the meaning and
hence in the understanding of the utterance. What applies to this
short, pithy utterance also applies to whole stretches of utte rance
such as we find in written texts.
Needless to say, various aspects of this proposal have co me
unde r attack in the philosophy of language .7 Enough of it remains
intact, however , to cut deepl y into the d ebate about intentions.
What is especially important is the general orientation which it
gives to the interpretive process. Even if the case has not been
fully made for intentions as the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the identification of illocutionary force, it sets texts
very firmly in the domain of human actions . So Dilthey and his
admirers were correct to develop a general hermeneutic which
would focus on the understanding of human actions generally as
the key to understanding texts. A text is not so me abstract entity
floating in free space endowed with meaning by some mystical
agent called language or discourse. Nor are texts natural objects
produced by passive, unintentional agents. Whatever else they are,
texts are fundamentally the fru it of human action and are
generally created to express human intentions and purposes.
Speakers produce meaning, not texts per se; in this process they
make use of discourse, and to reverse this order and focus
primarily on language and secondarily on what is actually achieved
by use of language is to get the cart before the ho rse. As
Strawson puts it succinctly, " as theorists, we know nothing of
human language unless we understand human speech." 8
Hence , when interpreters debate the role of intentions in their
wo rk it is hope lessly inadequate to resolve this issue simply by
insisting that we may not have access to the avowals of the author
as to what he or she meant. To work on this level is to work
bereft of crucial conceptual tools and thus prevent the relevant
issues being canvassed appropriately from the outset of the
discussion. Besides, making an avowal about our inte ntion is only
one way of getting access to our intention, and we may be more
or less fallible in our claims in this domain. The text itself will
be a vital part of the evidence as to what intentions are expressed
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in the work, and it is the task of the interpreter to develop skill in
picking up what they are and hence determining what the force of
the utterance under review may be. Nor will it do to confuse
intentions with logically distinct matters such as motives, desires,
feelings and other mental acts and events.9 To do so is to make
elementary blunders in the philosophy of mind and breed
unnecessary confusion in the field of hermeneutics.
Yet we must be careful in all our claims about both human
actions and intentions . The terrain here is extraordinarily slippery
and it is easy to fall prey to simplistic theories of action.
Contrary to the standard orthodoxy on the subject, I seriously
doubt if a general theory of human action is in fact intellectually
attainable. This is not to decry the attempt to tie actions to
intentions conceptually, but I am not fully convinced that all that
human agents do as responsible agents is done intentionally. It is
certainly useful to begin with a firm connection between actions
and intentions, but this is the first word; it is unlikely to be the
last. Thus I may set out to do x and end up doing y without at all
realizing what I was doing or intending to do what I did. For
example, contemporary television evangelists insist that they are
simply using modern media to spread the old-time gospel, while in
actual fact many of them are offering a new gospel message and
their actions are more akin to that of an entertainer than that of
an evangelist.
That they would vehemently reject such a
description of their action is beside the point. They are simpl y
unaware of the social character of their behavior and how it may
be legitimately understood.
If this example seems too
controversial, consider the situation where I set out to shoot
Murphy in the Enniskillen stockyard filled with cattle. I fire and
miss, but my action of shooting scares the cattle and they
stampede, trampling Murphy to death. Here I have the intention
to kill Murphy and I kiII him, congratulating myself all the way to
prison for what I have done; but I do not kill him intentionally . I
suspect that examples like these may crop up quite frequently in
our work on human texts, and anti-intentionalists are correct to
focus on how tricky intentions really are. However, they tend to
misread the significance of their astute observations by failing to
see this as a signal to look afresh at the whole notion of action
rather than as an invitation to focus on texts in themselves. We
need to pursue the complexity of human speech - acts rather than
just look again at the language and text. This is what I meant at
the outset of this paper when I suggested that the debate about
intentions was misplaced; it is less a matter of the relevance of
certain kinds of evidence than it is about the total orientation of
our work in hermeneutics. It is crucial in this orientation to place
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texts where they belong; in the stream of human life, thought and
action.
We might summarize the fundamental thesis we are driving
towards in this wa y: Hermeneutics is not so much the stud y of
what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved.
If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention
and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more o r less
than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and
charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and
achievement may coincide more often that not. In an y case, the
old proverb holds; actions speak louder than words; so it is the
actions which should get our full attention.
Moreover, in
understanding actions we do well to adopt the lofty vision outlined
by Dilthey: " The ultimate goal of the hermeneutic process is to
understand an author better than he understood himse lf." 10 This
is clearl y the case with many human actions, and thus we do well
to set ourselves this task in hermeneutics. In the light of this, the
task of the interpreter is to summon all the relevant evidence and
all the ski ll that can be mustered to elucidate the nature of the
achievement in question . For the author, the road to mea ning is
paved by good achievements, and the versatile and wily
interpreter will map out such achievements as lucidly as possible.
In constructing such maps, it will be useful to bear the following
general rubrics in mind (all of which stem from construing a text
as an achievement or an action and all of which have been
vigorously advocated at one time or another in the history of
hermeneutics).
First, it is useful to keep a distinction between the elucidation
of a text and the evaluation of a text. As with the evaluatio n of
actions generally, it is morally required that we know what a
person has done in some detail before we evaluate the worth of
what has been done. This holds for the study of action in the
writing of texts. In the evaluation of a text, it is important a t
times to bear in mind the intended aim of the author.
For
example, if a writer intended to write a satire or an apocalypse, it
is clearly erroneous to evaluate such work as if it were a piece of
sober historical narrative . Intention in itself does not determine,
in some simplistic fashion, precisely what value we should attach
to a particular work, but it should be taken into account in the
evaluative process overall. We may even need to take into account
the motives of an author as we evaluate a text. Thus, if we know
that a writer's motive was to smear the good name of an
opponent, then this will have an obvious bearing on our val ue of
the worth of the text. The process of evaluation as a whole will
involve a variety of criteria, depending on our commitments and
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the express point of our evaluations. The good interpreter will
develop a high degree of self knowledge in this area without
sacrificing nimbleness of touch and economy of operation.
Second, in elucidating a text, it will be crucial to attend to the
linguistic repertoire of an author. The study of grammar, syntax,
vocabulary, genre, style, local idioms, usage, and the like, are
indispensable. In this there is no substitute for the demanding
task of mastering the original languages. The loss of these in the
modern seminary is surely to be deeply regretted. Also crucial is
a knowledge of how to read a book as a whole, dismantle it and
then put it back together again . Here concessions to the natural
language of the reader can legitimately be made, and it is crucial
to bear in mind the communicative conventions Traina has
captured in his analysis of the relationships to be found with a
text. 11
We need also to bear in mind the innovations and
transformations which an author may have introduced. In all, we
need to know the capacities and range of options available to an
author in producing a text. If we neglect this, we are liable to
underestimate or overestimate what has been , or fail to perceive
what action has actually been performed .
Third, we need to develop a keen eye for the historical context
and particular circumstances in which a text has been written. At
this point, the current wrangle between historians and literary
critics is of deep significance. It is certainly true that historians
have not always served us as well as they might. As far as the
interpretation of Scripture is concerned, they have at times
dismantled the texts into atomistic bits and pieces, they have lost
the text in a mass of genetic and background information, they
have indulged in fanciful speculation which is intellectually
unedifying, they have set unduly restrictive limits on the options
open to the contemporary theologian, and they have arrogantly set
aside exegetical insights from the astonishingly rich heritage of
interpretation which is available to us. Whatever catalogue of sins
we cobble together, we cannot ignore history if we construe the
interpretation of a text as the interpretation of a human
achievement. Achievements take place in a context and in a set of
circumstances. To understand them is to see them as making sense
within the conventions, assumptions, values, beliefs and attitudes
of their situation. Hence our knowledge of an author's repertoire
of linguistic action depends on historical information about the
period and the circumstances of the actual writing. Those who
focus on a close reading of the text as an autonomous object

either ignore this at their peril or smuggle precisely such
information into the interpretive process without acknowledgment.
There is another reason why history is important. Some texts
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cannot be understood at all adequately if we do not know
something about the ideas and the events concerning which they
speak. If we read a text ahistorically in such circumstances we are
liable to go astray. Equally, if a writer is making a rejoinder to
another text, it is important that we have access to such
information. Thus, if an interpreter insists that Job is a response
to Deuteronomy, or that James is a response to Paul, we need the
aid of the historian in evaluating such claims. How we resolve
these issues will have a clear bearing on the illocutionary force of
much of what is said. We cannot say in advance when or how
historical information will be relevant.
Some texts are more
heteronomous than others, but even in seemingly autonomous
books like Proverbs it is exceptionally illuminating to have some
idea of the proverbial repertoire available at the time of writing,
the traditions out of which the book emerges, and the way in
which the current text of Proverbs may represent or depart from
these conventions.
Of course our judgments in history are
invariably contested , and it is easy to be carried away by those
alternatives which chime with our prepossessions. The sensitive
interpreter will soon learn to make a virtue of such necessities
while taking with radical seriousness the canons of historical
judgment.
It is in this context that we should deal with the place of a
text within the canon of Scripture as a whole . Two points deserve
mention.
First, it is both important and useful to see what
happens to our understanding of a text when it has been placed in
a sacred canon by a community of faith . It is best to designate
our intellectual undertakings at this level not as the elucidation of
the text but as the careful integration of the content of a variety
of texts in a wider theological vision. When we appropriate the
significance of a text of Scripture and relate it intimately to our
expanding metaphysical commitments, how we do so will depend
in part on how we relate that text to our understanding of other
relevant, scriptural texts. Significance, in turn , will depend o n
elucidation in the sense that we cannot satisfactorily gauge the
value of a text without first knowing what the text means. He nce
we need to tread warily when claims are made about the canonical
meaning of a text.
Perhaps we should speak of canonical
significance rather than canonical meaning .
Second, when we deal with the text as part of the canon of
Scripture much more attention needs to be given to the broader
historical considerations which are at stake.
The process of
canonization was part of a wider enterprise which the early church
initiated in order to deal with its life and teachings in the crises
which it faced over several centuries. Thus to cope with its
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problems, the church not only put together a canon of Scripture, it
also developed various creeds and put episcopacy in place. On an
intellectual level, there is a deep sense in which creed and
Scripture go together canonically, while episcopacy can be read as
an attempt to secure these canons as integral to the social authority
of the church and as constitutive of its identity. Much harm has
been done in Protestantism when this is neglected. Scripture has
been called upon to perform functions which were designed to be
met by the creeds, and the creeds have been ignored or neglected
in the canonical construal of Scripture. A canonical reading of
Scripture which fails to take into account the early creeds of the
church is therefore historically inept, and this is one more reason
for treating the canonical interpretation of Scripture at the level of
significance and appropriation rather than at the level of
elucidation and exegesis.
In conclusion , one further point springs naturally to mind in
our brief comments on the rubrics of interpretation. When we
deal with a text, we cannot ignore the subject or particular
content in which the writer is engaged. To take a simple example,
adequate elucidation of a classical philosophical text depends in
part on one's capacity to understand philosophical ideas and issues.
The good interpreter will be able to draw on insights which have
been furnished by wrestling with the questions the text addresses
and with rival ways of construing and resolving them. Initially,
one's capacity in this field may well develop by means of
extensive interaction and dialogue with the text in hand . More
appropriately, we might say that our reading of a text is like a
dialogue with an author or speaker whose action continues across
space and time into the present to inform and develop our
judgments and latent human capacities.
This is clearly the case with Scripture. Deep and profound
elucidations of the text depend on spiritual insight and on
theological sensitivity as well as on standard linguistic, literary and
historical skill. This is as it should be if the interpretation of a
text is the interpretation of a human achievement, for this is
inevitably set in the stream of human life, thought and action.
Out of the richness of their experience, the depths of their
theological acumen, the storehouse of their ability to communicate
their proposals, the great interpreters take the reader into a new
world of wonder and challenge where fresh horizons are
encountered and prevailing capacities are developed.
It is
impossible to capture what is at stake here in a set of formal rules
or in conceptual analysis of the underlying assumptions and
principles. These have their place, but they are no substitute for
direct exposure to those who have already mastered this art and
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can share it with others. In this respect it is difficult to surpass
what Robert Traina instantiates for those fortunate enough to have
·
been his students.
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